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Abstract 
Purpose - This study examines the mechanisms that were being employed to enhance board 
accountability of Ghanaian listed banks, and how board accountability can be improved. 
Design/methodology/approach - The 2011 and 2016 annual reports of listed banks on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange were examined and a survey questionnaire was sent to board members 
of nine banks. 
Findings - The results show that the directors of Ghanaian listed banks prioritize a shareholder 
approach to accountability, with a shift towards stakeholders. Audit committees, external audits 
and internal audits were the main mechanisms employed by these banks to enhance board 
accountability. Some of these mechanisms were not utilised effectively by a number of these 
banks.  
Practical implications - Board accountability can be improved by appointing very competent 
people to the board, the national adoption of a mandatory code of corporate governance, regular 
rotation of external auditors, and requiring non-executive directors (NED) to stand for re-
election more frequently. Our research identifies weaknesses of accountability mechanisms and 
offers timely recommendations for banks and regulators to build stronger corporate governance 
systems. 
Originality/value - This study obtained valuable opinions of the boards of directors, provides 
insights on boards of Ghanaian listed banks, and contributes to the literature of corporate 
governance and accountability in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has gained an enormous amount of attention over the past three or so 
decades. This has been due mainly to the large corporate collapses that have occurred 
predominantly in the western world, which have been attributed to failures in corporate 
governance. These companies include Barings Bank, Enron and Parmalat (Porter, 2009). The 
downfall of Barings Bank in 1995 was attributed to weaknesses in internal controls as well as 
inadequate supervision. Enron’s collapse was a result of the lack of directors with integrity and 
honesty, as well as the inability of the company’s external auditor to ask searching questions 
for fear of losing non-audit related fees (Mallin, 2010). 
In 2008, Lehman Brothers, a big investment bank, filed for bankruptcy. Its failure was due to 
heavy involvement of subprime mortgages, excessive leverage and risk taking, strategic 
mistakes and poor corporate governance. Lehman’s board of directors was inexperienced at 
overseeing a diversified investment bank. During 2007-2009, the global financial crisis was 
triggered by the devalued sub-prime mortgages in the USA and spread over the world. This 
resulted in huge losses, failures of financial institutions, and bail-outs by the governments in 
USA and Europe. The credit crunch caused a worldwide reduction of spending and affected 
the global economy.  
The board of directors plays an important role in improving corporate governance. Corporate 
entities often employ several measures to ensure board accountability, yet these measures do 
not always work, resulting in companies collapsing, such as Enron and Lehman Brothers. The 
impact of these corporate failures has not only been devastating for shareholders, but has also 
had a negative impact on other stakeholders and society as a whole. A stakeholder is any person 
or group that affects or is affected by the activities of an organisation (Freeman, 1984). As a 
consequence of this, society has begun to demand greater accountability from corporate 
entities. A review of news headlines shows that the public’s interest and demands about the 
activities of companies are becoming increasingly commonplace. As a result, most corporate 
entities in the western world have accepted the ideology that they are accountable not just to 
shareholders, but also to stakeholders (Porter, 2009).  
However, there seems to be limited research on the subject of corporate governance and 
accountability in emerging economies, especially in Africa (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Nyamori et 
al., 2017). The research that exists on the subject, as it pertains to Ghana for instance, seems to 
suggest that corporate entities have not yet shifted from the parochial attitude of shareholder 
driven accountability (GIMPA, 2003). The banking industry plays an important role in the 
Ghanaian economy. Adams & Mehran (2011) indicate that little is known about the 
effectiveness of boards in banks as many empirical studies exclude financial firms from their 
sample. Bank regulation in Ghana has focused mostly on banks’ minimum capital requirement 
to absorb losses; it has been silent on corporate governance practices such as board structure 
and accountability (Bokpin, 2013). Bank of Ghana is in the process of implementing new 
corporate governance guidelines addressing issues of board structure, tenure, etc. Governor of 
the Bank of Ghana, Dr. Earnest Addison, has called on banks to institute strong corporate 
governance structures to mitigate risks as a lack of it partially contributed to the collapse of 
Unique Trust and Capital banks in 2017 (Ghanaweb, 2017). Dr. Richmond Atuahene, a lecturer 
at the Ghana Banking College and CEO of Universal Capital Management, said major issues 
harming the banking industry are a lack of board independence, incompetent board members, 
and a lack of duty of care. Therefore, a stronger board is needed (Ghanaweb, 2017). 
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A large proportion of research on board accountability has focused on accountability 
mechanisms from the perspective of company annual reports (Sharma and Singh 2009; 
Mohamad and Sulong, 2010). However, this approach bears the risk of form-over-substance. 
There is the possibility that companies would publish what the society and regulators expect to 
see, but the actual nature of their practices may not be as expected. For example, a company 
may state in its annual report that a particular board member is an independent NED; however, 
there may exist a personal relationship between this NED and an executive director, and this 
relationship is what perhaps led to the appointment of the NED. Such personal relationships 
have the potential to compromise independence.   
According to the World Bank (2005), the accountability mechanisms adopted in Ghana, such 
as independent NEDs and audit committees are limited in their effectiveness. Other 
researchers, such as Tsamenyi et al. (2007), support this claim. These issues, coupled with the 
fact that a limited amount of research exists on Ghanaian corporate governance practices, 
warrant the need for this study.  
The research examines banks listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The Ghana Stock Exchange 
was incorporated as a private company limited by guarantee in 1989. There are three categories 
of members on the exchange, namely Licensed Dealing Members, Associate Members and 
Government Securities Dealers (PDs). In 2012, the Exchange had 35 companies, of which nine 
were banks. These banks were the Ghana Commercial Bank Limited, Ecobank Ghana Limited, 
Ecobank Transnational Incorporated, Standard Chartered Bank Ghana Limited, Unique Trust 
Bank Limited, The Trust Bank Limited (The Gambia), CAL Bank Limited, Home Finance 
Company Bank Limited and SG-SSB Bank Limited.    
The aim of this research is to examine board accountability in Ghanaian listed banks. The 
objectives of the study are to identify and examine the mechanisms that are being employed to 
enhance board accountability, particularly in comparison to the requirements of the Security 
and Exchange Commission Ghana (SEC) code of corporate governance, and how board 
accountability can be improved. This research attempts to answer the following questions: 
 To whom are the boards of directors accountable? 
 Which mechanisms are being employed to enhance board accountability for Ghanaian 
listed banks? 
 How can the board accountability be improved? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature on corporate governance and board accountability with particular emphasis on the 
Ghanaian corporate environment. Section 3 provides details about the methodology adopted 
for the research. Section 4 provides analysis of the research results. Section 5 provides the 
conclusion, and also makes recommendations for further research.  
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews relevant theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance and 
board accountability. It starts by looking critically at some of the recognised definitions of 
corporate governance and attempts to assess their relationship with the concept of board 
accountability. It also reviews the key theories that underpin the development of corporate 
governance. The responsibilities of the board of directors as per Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Financial Reporting Council (FRC), King III Report, 
and SEC Ghana are examined with a critical emphasis on board accountability. The section 
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also examines the mechanisms of accountability and concludes with a review of the corporate 
governance framework in Ghana. 
2.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance    
Corporate governance has no single definition. Some of the widely accepted definitions of 
corporate governance are examined in turn. 
Cadbury Committee (1992:14) defines corporate governance by stating: “Corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.” This requires  
company directors to maintain systems of control so a company fulfils its obligations to whom 
it is accountable. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004) 
consists of a series of interconnected relationships between NEDs, executive directors, 
management personnel, shareholders, and other stakeholders. It provides a framework in which 
corporate objectives are set, resources are provided and performance is effectively monitored 
and reported on. The OECD definition is wide ranging and covers the stakeholders. The 
Financial times (2012) defines corporate governance as: “How a company is managed in terms 
of the institutional systems and protocols meant to ensure accountability and sound ethics.” 
The definition reflects on the importance of procedures that promote ethical behaviour in a 
company. The Stock and Exchange Commission Ghana (2010:2) defines corporate governance 
as: “The practices and processes used to direct and manage the affairs of a corporate body with 
the object of balancing the attainment of corporate objectives with the alignment of corporate 
behaviour to the expectations of society and accountability to shareholders and other 
stakeholders.” This definition highlights the importance of balancing corporate objectives with 
societal objectives in order to ensure the long term survival of the corporate body. Therefore, 
it is most relevant to this study. 
 
2.2 Theories 
These theories in corporate governance are drawn from a wide range of fields including 
accountancy, finance, economics, law, management studies and corporate behaviour. 
Corporate governance, in essence, is underpinned by four main theories: the agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, transaction cost economics, and stewardship theory (Mallin, 2010).  
Agency theory is the result of a separation between control and ownership of an entity. 
Managers are provided with funds from investors who subsequently rely on the expertise of 
these managers to increase their returns on investment. Corporate governance is concerned 
with the measures put in place to ensure that managers act in the best interest of investors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Contrary to the agency theory, stewardship 
theory believes that directors do not always aim to maximize their own interests; they can act 
responsibly with independence and integrity (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Tricker, 2009). 
Stewardship theory stresses the beneficial consequences on shareholder returns of facilitative 
authority structures of board of directors. 
According to Coarse (1937), there are a number of cost savings that can be made by 
internalising the transactions of a company. However, by pursuing such a strategy the company 
becomes larger and therefore more likely to be inefficient.  Corporate governance procedures 
and accountability mechanisms are therefore necessary to manage this risk. Transaction cost 
theory in economic (Williamson, 1996) also contributed to this debate. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that companies should not only consider the interest of 
shareholders when making decisions, but should also take into consideration the interest of 
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other groups that affect or are affected by the activities of the company. This is because 
companies owe accountability to these groups as well. These groups are commonly referred to 
as stakeholders, and include employees, providers of finance, customers, suppliers and 
government agencies (Freeman, 1984).  
 
2.3 The Board of Directors and Accountability 
 
The board of directors is basically tasked with the responsibility for directing the affairs of the 
company. According to the OECD (2004), the responsibilities of the board of directors can be 
summarised into: providing strategic guidance, monitoring of executive management and 
ensuring effective accountability to the shareholders and the company. The board is also 
required to take into consideration the interest of other stakeholders such as creditors, 
employees, suppliers, customers and the general public. The principles emphasise that the 
board of directors should always act in good faith and in the best interest of the company. It 
also highlights the issue of equal treatment for all shareholders as well as the consistent 
application of high ethical standards.  
 
Similarly, the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2012 requires the board to provide strategic 
leadership, to ensure the existence of a sound system of internal controls, and the achievement 
of corporate objectives. In South Africa, apart from the key roles of strategy formulation, 
monitoring and accountability, boards are required to provide a very high level of ethical 
leadership (King Report, 2002). The King Report (2009) requires boards to adopt an ethical 
dimension to managing the affairs of the company. It requires the board to develop strategy 
with a view to creating a sustainable company.  
 
Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Ghana (2010) requires the 
board to oversee the management of the company with the objective of protecting and 
increasing shareholder wealth. Similar to the OECD, the SEC Code requires the board to be 
accountable to the company and its shareholders. In Ghana, stakeholder rights are established 
and protected under the general laws pertaining to commerce, labour and contracts. 
 
The Oxford Dictionary defines accountability as “the quality of being accountable; liability to 
give account of, and answer for, discharge of duties or conduct”. Accountability as it pertains 
to the board of directors could therefore refer to the fact that because the board of directors are 
appointed by the shareholders to steer the affairs of the company on their behalf, they have an 
obligation to give account of, and answer for their actions (Porter, 2009). 
 
The King Report (2002:6) defines the accountabilities and responsibilities of directors by 
stating that: “In governance terms, one is accountable at common law and by statute to the 
company of a director, and one is responsible to the stakeholders identified as relevant to the 
business of the company. The stakeholder concept of being accountable to all legitimate 
stakeholders is rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to everyone 
would result in their being accountable to no one. The modern approach is for the board to 
identify the company’s stakeholders, including its shareowners and to agree policies as to how 
the relationship with those stakeholders should be advanced and managed in the interests of 
the company.” 
 
The logical question that would follow from this is, to whom is the board accountable?  Over 
the years, attention has shifted gradually from accountability to the shareholders, to focusing 
on accountability to a broader range of stakeholders (Mallin 2010). However, the shareholder 
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approach still underlies the audit and accounting requirements of companies in countries like 
UK, Canada, USA, New Zealand and Australia, and therefore it is still a generally accepted 
approach (Porter, 2009).  
 
Brennan and Solomon (2008) indicate that a number of mechanisms are being employed   
various organisations around the world to ensure that the management and the board account 
effectively to shareholders and other stakeholders. These mechanisms include: NEDs, splitting 
the roles of chief executive and chairman, and board sub-committees, all of which  can enhance 
board effectiveness and add value to shareholders. Other mechanisms include governance 
regulations, institutional investors, financial reporting and disclosure, internal control, external 
audit, etc. Regulation is a mechanism of governance. Institutional investors can play a positive 
monitoring role in corporate governance. Audit committees as board mechanisms to enhance 
accountability haven’t been widely researched (DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley & Zaman, 2007), 
and there has been less research on internal audits (Brennan & Soloman, 2008). Audit 
committees were established to prevent senior executives from dominating audit processes and 
they also serve as the link between the board and external auditors. Audit committees are 
comprised typically of entirely or mainly independent NEDs (Tricker, 2009). Most of the 
studies show that audit committee effectiveness is improved by greater audit committee 
independence (Klein, 2002; Bédard et al., 2004). Internal auditing is an independent and 
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an 
organization’s operations. The increasing demand for greater accountability from corporate 
boards has led to greater recognition of the role of internal auditors in corporate governance.  
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Ghana 
Companies in Ghana are regulated by clear frameworks and laws. The regulatory framework 
for corporate governance in Ghana consists of the Ghana Companies Code (1963), the 
Securities Industry Law (1993), and the Listing Regulations of the Ghana Stock Exchange 
(GSE) 1990. These are supported by the Ghana National Accounting Standards and the Codes 
of Conduct issued by the Ghana Institute of Chartered Accountants.  
 
The GSE listing regulations require that investors are provided with information, such as the 
board members, key management and their compensation, material foreseeable risk, major 
share ownership and voting rights, as well as financial and operating results of the company. 
In addition, the GSE stipulates the timeframe within which annual reports should be circulated. 
The Code and the GSE listing regulations require that listed companies establish audit 
committees. The Code also contains provisions with regard to the appointment, removal and 
retirement of directors (Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
 
Researchers have investigated issues and impacts relating to the implementation of these 
regulations. Research conducted by the Ghana Institute of Management and of Public 
Administration on the top 100 companies (based on turnover) in 2003 showed that 49 out of 
61 boards that responded to the survey believed that they were accountable to the shareholders 
of the company, while 5 out of 18 public companies claimed they were accountable to the 
government, and one private company claimed it was accountable to the CEO (GIMPA, 2003). 
There were no manuals for the boards in 46 out of 61 companies that responded.  
 
Kuranchie-Pong et al. (2016) examined the disclosure and risk-taking for banks in Ghana and 
revealed that market discipline is not effective in Ghana. The World Bank (2005) reported that 
the board members of listed companies in Ghana were generally not independent, and were 
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therefore not effective in managing corporate governance issues. The report also contained 
statements to the effect that the effectiveness of audit committees was limited.  
 
Okeahalam (2004) indicates that the issue and challenges for corporate governance in Africa 
include: the effectiveness of boards, quality of monitoring and transparency of financial 
statements. Some NEDs in Africa may act as rubber stamps for decisions and there are cultures 
of corruption. In Ghana, the challenges include lack of enforcement of relevant laws, more 
transparency, and government interference of state owned enterprises. Adegbite (2012) also 
suggests that the government of Ghana should fight corruption through good governance, an 
effective legal system, and proper enforcement by regulators. Agyemang et al. (2013) suggest 
that the regulators should enforce laws and regulations, protect minority shareholders and 
enhance board independence. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
The greater proportion of primary data for the study was collected with a survey questionnaire. 
Telephone interviews were used to complement the questionnaire data. The questionnaire was 
structured to contain both closed ended and open ended questions. The closed ended questions 
were used to collect quantitative data, while the open ended questions were used to collect 
qualitative data. Three types of questions were asked: the first type requires only a Yes or No 
answer, the second type is open-ended inviting directors to offer opinions so we gain additional 
insights, and the third type is based on 5-point Likert scales, requesting directors to assess the 
degree of opinions, for example, assess the level of satisfaction with the amount of resources 
available to the audit committee. 1 indicates ‘low’ levels of satisfaction and 5 indicate ‘high’ 
levels of satisfaction. Questionnaires were used because they have the ability to provide data 
from a large or relatively large population within a limited timeframe (Ryan et al., 2002). 
Secondary data was obtained from the annual reports of the nine banks listed on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange, Bloomberg and Datastream. This method was adopted because it was 
considered a more cost effective and timely way of obtaining the data. 
 
The board members of all nine banks listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange in 2012 constitute 
the population for the study. The study adopts total population sampling because of the small 
size of the population. This method of sampling provides a deeper understanding of the 
particular area being studied (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
 
The internet based Survey Monkey served as the platform for developing and delivering the 
questionnaire. It was considered as the most appropriate survey mechanism for the study 
because it possessed the necessary features to support the style of questions designed for the 
study. The researcher’s personal contacts with five of the target directors were used to obtain 
the email and telephone details of some directors. Some top directors at the Ghana Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning were also contacted to assist in providing the personal contact 
details of some of the target directors. The personal email addresses of 69 directors of listed 
banks were obtained and emails were sent to them. There were 39 responses received and used 
for data analysis. In addition, four telephone clarification interviews were conducted. The 
researcher applied the highest ethical standards during the data collection exercise. 
Respondents were assured that the data provided was to be kept completely anonymous.  
 
4. Results and Analysis 
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This section presents and analyses the data obtained from the annual reports of the nine listed 
banks, the survey questionnaire and interviews. Lastly the section offers recommendations to 
improve board accountability. 
 
4.1 Accountability of the Board 
The 39 respondents to the survey in 2012 comprise 15 (38.5%) executive directors and 24 
(61.5%) NEDs. This section examines the responses received for the question: to whom is the 
board of directors accountable? A total of 37 (95%) out of the 39 directors indicated that the 
board is accountable to the shareholders. The remaining two (5%) directors indicated that the 
board is accountable to the shareholders and Government. These remaining two directors, 
however, happen to be directors of the Ghana Commercial Bank. Since the majority of shares 
of the Ghana Commercial bank are owned by the Government of Ghana (GCB, 2011), it can 
reasonably be assumed that 100 per cent of the boards of Ghanaian listed banks claim that 
boards of directors are accountable to shareholders. 
This finding is consistent with GIMPA (2003) that the majority of Ghanaian boards claim to 
be accountable to the shareholders of the company. The response implies that directors of 
Ghanaian listed banks prioritize a shareholder approach to accountability. It shows that 
shareholders are currently the primary concern and the priority. This, however, does not mean 
that Ghananian listed banks neglect the interests of other stakeholders and do not consider other 
stakeholders’ interests in their operations. SEC (2010) Code requires the Boards to be 
accountable to the company and its shareholders. On the other hand, the SEC’s definition of 
corporate governance requires the company to be accountable to shareholders and stakeholders. 
Various stakeholders’ groups are essential for a company’s survival and success. 
We further examined the disclosure of CSR initiatives in annual reports in 2011 and 2016. Six 
banks have disclosed significantly more information that is relevant to stakeholder 
engagement. This showed a marked shift of focus to cover wider stakeholder groups and  
broaden the scope of stakeholder engagement. This is largely consistent with Collier (2008) 
and Porter (2009) as they show that there has been a shift from the shareholder model of 
accountability to the stakeholder model of accountability. For example, Ecobank Ghana 
Limited disclosed only two paragraphs of social responsibility in 2011, with initiatives 
contributing to societal welfare such as education and health service. In 2016 there were six 
pages of information covering various CSR activities such as education, health, financial 
inclusion, sustainability/environment and global initiative. They spent GH¢ 3.38 million on 
their CSR activities in 2016, an increase of 19 per cent in the figure for 2015. 
4.2 Mechanisms of Board Accountability 
Brennan and Solomon (2008) indicate that a number of mechanisms are being employed in 
various organisations around the world to ensure that the management and the board account 
effectively to shareholders and other stakeholders. A review of the 2011 annual reports of the 
nine banks listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange identified audit committees, internal auditors 
and external auditors as the main mechanisms being used to ensure and enhance accountability. 
The effectiveness of these mechanisms with respect to the nine banks is examined in turn.  
 
4.2.1 Effectiveness of Audit Committee   
The SEC (2010) Code requires every listed company to establish an audit committee. The Code 
further stipulates certain adherences that enhance the effectiveness of audit committees and 
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thereby improve board accountability. These adherences and the various extents to which the 
nine banks have complied with are examined as follows. 
The composition of boards of directors of nine banks have been examined through  2011 and 
2016 annual reports, including the composition of the audit committees. The average board 
size is 8 in 2011 and 10 in 2016, which fits within the recommended board size range of 
between 8 and 16. SEC (2010) requires that at least one-third of board members must be NEDs, 
and the audit committee should comprise at least three directors with the majority being NEDs. 
All banks have met with the requirements regarding composition of the board and audit 
committee in these two years, except Unique Trust Bank as this bank’s annual report was not 
available in 2016. The implication is that the executive directors would not be in the position 
to dominate the audit processes of these banks.  
The SEC Code requires every audit committee to have a charter or terms of reference spelling 
out clearly the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee. All nine listed banks have 
terms of references for their audit committees in 2011. This implies that the main board would 
have a basis upon which the performance of members could be assessed.   
The SEC (2010) recommends that the audit committee should be provided with all the 
resources needed to perform its role effectively. According to the Code, a lack of access to 
timely and relevant information would cause the audit committee to fail in its duty of managing 
and overseeing the audit process effectively. The response from the questionnaire shows that 
77 per cent of the audit committee members were extremely satisfied with the level of access 
to information and resources while 23 per cent of directors were moderately satisfied with the 
level of access to information and resources. The fact that 23 per cent of the directors are not 
extremely satisfied with the level of access to information and resources is a cause for concern. 
This could mean that some audit committees are basing audit related decisions on incomplete 
information. This could also mean that the directors may for instance want to conduct an 
investigation into suspected fraud and may be forced to ignore the situation because of the lack 
of resources to engage outside specialist expertise.  
In 2011, 36 out of 38 audit committee members for the listed banks held some form of 
accounting and finance qualification. All the audit committee members possess a minimum of 
four years experience at a senior management level. The two directors without any form of 
accounting and finance qualifications were directors of Ecobank Ghana Limited. These 
members held architectural and engineering qualifications. SEC (2010) recommends that the 
audit committee should be comprised of directors with adequate knowledge of accounting and 
finance. Although the two NEDs that possess architectural and engineering qualifications have 
several years of experience at the senior management level, these directors lack accounting and 
finance qualifications, may have had a negative impact on the quality of their work, and hence 
board accountability. The nature of the role of the audit committee is such that a thorough 
knowledge of accounting, finance and auditing is required to be effective.  
All 39 respondents claim that newly appointed audit committee members are taken through an 
orientation session. The SEC (2010) requires every listed company to conduct an orientation 
exercise for all of its newly appointed directors, including audit committee members. So the 
members would have been well informed of their roles, responsibilities and information on 
laws and regulations.  
With regards to training, all 39 respondents claim that audit committee members are provided 
with on-going training that assists in the performance of their duties. The SEC (2010) requires 
the board to provide the audit committee members with continuous on-going training in fields 
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that would enhance the quality of their work. The implication is that the committee members 
are kept abreast of changes in financial reporting, auditing standards and laws that affect the 
operations of the bank.  
The audit committee’s independence from management was rated as very high by 72 per cent 
of respondents while 28 per cent of respondents rated it as moderate. The SEC (2010) requires 
the audit committee to be demonstrably and unquestionably independent of management. 
Agyemang & Castellini (2015) did four case studies of Ghanaian PLCs and reveal that the 
board audit committee is not very effective in three PLCs due to the presence of controlling 
shareholders. Both the controlling shareholders and management can affect the independence 
and effectiveness of audit committee.  
The SEC (2010) Code requires the audit committee to conduct an annual assessment of the 
company’s internal controls and report on this in the annual report. An assessment of the 2011 
annual reports reveals that no such assessment was made by any of these banks. The reasons 
for the lack of assessments are categorised as follows: 49 per cent of the respondents claim that 
the bank has its own code which is based on international best practice, 15 per cent of the 
respondents’ claim that the SEC Code is voluntary and 36 per cent of the respondents opted 
not to comment on the issue. We further checked the banks’ annual reports in 2016 and reveal 
that only two banks, Ecobank Ghana and Ghana Commercial Bank, report that the boards have 
conducted an annual assessment of the company’s internal controls. Actually, the profitability 
of these two banks increased and non-performing loan reduced. For other banks, the failure of 
the audit committee to conduct annual assessments of the internal controls could mean that the 
internal controls systems in place are not sufficiently effective to ensure that the bank achieves 
its objectives and ensures board accountability.  
4.2.2 Effectiveness of the Internal Audit Function 
The SEC (2010) requires every listed company to establish an effective internal audit function. 
All nine banks have internal audit units. The internal audit function was viewed as very 
effective by 54 per cent of the directors, as moderately effective by 38 per cent of the directors, 
and as neutral by 8 per cent of directors. The concerns that some directors have were due to the 
lack of professionally qualified staff and the internal audit function lacked sufficient 
independence from management. These two issues are cause for serious concern. Okeahalam 
(2004) indicates that for African listed firms, internal auditors may fail to expose wrong-doing 
in the company for fear of losing their job or incompetence. According to Solomon (2010), the 
lack of well qualified staff with appropriate training in accounting and audit would mean that 
reports and recommendations being sent to the audit committee may not be credible and 
reliable. The audit committee may therefore be basing key decisions on inaccurate information. 
This is likely to have a negative impact on audit quality and board accountability.  
4.2.3 Effectiveness of the External Audit Function 
The SEC (2010) requires every listed company to subject its annual financial statements to an 
independent audit. The Code further requires the external auditors to be demonstrably and 
unquestionably independent of management. In order to maintain independence, the Code 
requires that the external auditors are rotated on a regular basis. A review of the annual report 
of all nine banks reveals claims by the banks’ boards that its external auditors are fully 
independent of management. The study shows that only two respondents perceive that the 
external auditors are not demonstrably and unquestionably independent as some external 
auditors had long term personal relations with key management personnel. According to Clarke 
(2004), long-term personal relations between the external auditor and management personnel 
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have the potential to compromise the independence and objectivity of the audit. The 
fundamental purpose of the external audit is to provide the shareholders with assurance that the 
financial statements represent the true state of the bank’s financial affairs. A long- term 
personal friendship could cause the external auditor to be biased. This therefore implies that a 
level of personal detachment is required between the manager and the auditor in order to have 
a credible and objective audit report, which in effect enhances board accountability.  
4.3 Improving Board Accountability  
The study also sought to discover ways to improve board accountability in Ghanaian listed 
banks. The responses received from the directors can be categorised into the following groups:  
 Appointment of very competent persons to serve on the board. 
 Mandatory code that is based on international best practices. 
 Regular rotation of external auditors. 
 Requiring NEDs to stand for re-election more frequently. 
 
Appointing very competent persons to serve on the board and improve board accountability 
was suggested by 26% of the respondents. A mandatory code of corporate governance for all 
listed companies in Ghana was suggested by 23 per cent of the respondents to improve board. 
Another 23 per cent of respondents suggested that external auditors should be rotated on a more 
regular basis, while 13 per cent of respondents suggested that NEDs should stand for 
reappointment more frequently and 15 per cent of respondents opted not to comment on the 
issue.  
Improving board accountability by appointing highly trained and well experienced finance 
professionals to serve on the board was recommended by 26 per cent of directors. These 
directors also recommend relevant on-going training for board members. Carretta et al. (2010) 
stress the importance of training for board members and compliance with existing rules. On-
going training and development programs are essential for the enhancement of board 
accountability.  
A suggestion by 23 per cent of directors was that board accountability can be improved by the 
development of a mandatory code of corporate governance that is based on international best 
practice and adapted to the Ghanaian business and corporate environment. According to SEC 
(2010) the merits of such an approach were assessed by the Ghana Securities and Exchange 
Commission before the 2010 voluntary Code was issued. It was, however, decided that 
flexibility was needed to encourage growth of the financial market and as a result the 2010 
voluntary Code was issued. Apart from not being flexible, another disadvantage of a mandatory 
code, as pointed out by the FRC (2012), is that it shifts the focus of accountability from the 
shareholders to the Government. Krenn (2015) discusses the decoupling practice of companies 
due to high compliance costs. The advantage of a mandatory code is that, whatever requirement 
pertaining to accountability that is enshrined in the code would probably be adhered to. In 2016, 
SEC Ghana issued mandatory disclosure items for public listed companies in areas of 
compliance, board structure, auditing, and information disclosure. For example, it requires the 
company to indicate the existence of an effective internal control system. This is consistent 
with the call of this paper. We expect that these mandatory disclosure items will help strengthen 
corporate governance system for PLCs in Ghana.  
Regular rotation of the external auditors to improve board accountability was suggested by 23 
per cent of directors. This has the potential to maintain the independence and objectivity of the 
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external audit function (Tricker, 2009). The external auditors tend to work directly with 
management and over time may become very familiar with each other. This situation could 
compromise the auditor’s objectivity, the quality of the audit and hence board accountability.  
NEDs should stand for reappointment on a more regular basis was suggested by 13% of 
directors. This has the potential to enhance board accountability to shareholders. This is 
because a director is more likely to take steps to improve performance for fear of being replaced 
within a shorter time frame than usual.  The disadvantage of this approach has to do with the 
learning curve as every new director is likely to take a length of time to adjust and understand 
the activities of the a new bank.  
Bank of Ghana is in the process of implementing new corporate governance guidelines for 
the banking sector. NEDs shall have a tenure of three years for no more than two terms, and 
shall be in the majority of every board. The tenures of CEOs are to be capped at three five-year 
terms. Restrictions have also been placed on the size of boards as well as the retiring age for 
directors. The new guidelines ensure that there are independent structures to oversee those 
banks’ activities and protect stakeholder interest in a formalised manner. Some of our research 
findings are consistent with the proposed change of the new corporate governance guidelines. 
 
4.4 Firm Performance Indicators from 2011 to 2016 
 
Table 1 presents firm performance information for eight banks from 2011 to 2016. ROA is an 
indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets in percentage. ROA gives 
an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. ROE is the 
measure of a company’s profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates with 
the money shareholders have invested in percentage. Unique Trust Bank does not have annual 
reports for 2015 and 2016. Due to lack of sufficient firm performance information we exclude 
Unique Trust Bank from analysis in Table 1. The summary statistics of eight banks’ 
performance are presented in Table 1. 
 







share (GH¢) Capital adequacy ratio Non-performing loan ratio 
2011 3 21 0.19 0.18 0.11 
2012 4 30 0.22 0.19 0.09 
2013 5 34 0.43 0.19 0.08 
2014 5 35 0.53 0.19 0.08 
2015 3 20 0.44 0.20 0.15 
2016 2 11 0.51 0.21 0.16 
 
Notes: ROA: (12 months net income/average total assets)*100. Average total assets is the average of the beginning 
balance and ending balance of assets. ROE: (12 months net income available for shareholders/average total common 
equity)*100. Average total common equity is the average of the beginning balance and ending balance of equity. Earnings 
per share: net income available for common shareholders divided by the basic weighted average shares outstanding. 
Capital adequacy ratio is calculated as total capital divided by total risk-weighted assets. Non-performing loan ratio: the 
percentage of gross non-performing loans to total credit/advances portfolio (gross). The data are mostly from Bloomberg, 
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Table 1 presents the average bank performance information by year. ROA, ROE and EPS 
increased from 2011 to 2014, then declined until 2016. ROA and ROE were lower in 2016 
compared to 2011. The profitability ratios of Ecobank Ghana Limited, Ghana Commercial 
Bank, and SG-SSB Bank were higher in 2016 compared to 2011, and the remaining five banks 
were lower. Ecobank Transnational and Home Finance Company even suffered a loss in 2016. 
The capital adequacy ratio had increased over the years. Ghana increased a minimum capital 
requirement in 2009 for foreign banks and in 2012 for domestic-owned banks to make them 
more robust (Bokpin, 2013). The average capital adequacy ratio is 19%, well above the 
minimum 10 per cent requirement. Ghanaian listed banks were well capitalised. The non-
performing loan ratios were higher in 2015 and 2016, compared to previous years. In 
comparison, the reduced profitability and rising non-performing loan are issues of concern. 
 
In 2017, Unit Trust Bank went through receivership due to losses and impairment of capital. 
Listed companies, especially banks, tend to be very large institutions comprising several 
interconnections of stakeholder relationships. Should such an institution collapse, the 
consequences for society could be devastating. SEC (2010) indicates that audit committees, 
independent boards and NEDs do not guarantee good corporate governance. They are 
structures and mechanisms that must be properly implemented in order to achieve good 
corporate governance. Nowadays the banks in Ghana face more competition than before. We 
hope the new corporate governance guidelines to be released from Bank of Ghana will protect 
stakeholder interest in a formalised manner in the long run.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This study examined board accountability of Ghanaian listed banks, finding that the directors 
of Ghanaian listed banks prioritize a shareholder approach to accountability, with a shift 
towards stakeholders. Audit committees, external audits and internal audits are the main 
mechanisms being employed by these banks to enhance board accountability. Some of these 
mechanisms are not utilised effectively by a number of these banks. Board accountability can 
be improved by appointing very competent people to the board, the national adoption of a 
mandatory code of corporate governance, regular rotation of external auditors, and requiring 
NEDs to stand for re-election more frequently. 
This study obtained valuable opinions of board of directors, provides insights on boards of 
Ghanaian listed banks, and contributes to the literature of corporate governance and 
accountability in Africa. Okeahalam (2004) indicates that future research areas for African 
countries include the quality of internal and external monitoring, the effectiveness of boards, 
the transparency of financial statements. This paper has further examined the board 
accountability of Ghanaian listed banks, regarding effectiveness of monitoring and control.  
This paper offers important practical implications for policy, for example, one of our findings 
suggests that the NEDs should stand for re-election more frequently. This is consistent with 
the proposed change from the Bank of Ghana to cap the tenure of NEDs to two three-year 
terms. The Bank of Ghana is implementing new corporate governance guidelines to address 
issues such as board structure and tenure. Based on robust research evidence, this paper 
provides valuable insights for banks and regulators to initiate real world changes to build 
stronger corporate governance systems. 
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